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WAS BLIND BUT NOW I SEE: THE 
ARGUMENT FOR ADA APPLICABILITY TO 
THE INTERNET 
JEFFREY SCOTT RANEN* 
Abstract: This Note argues that the "public accommodations" provision 
of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to the Internet. 
A broad reading of the public accommodation clause in Title III in 
conjunction with the supporting case law and the statute's legislative 
history suggests that public accommodations are not limited to physical 
structures. Therefore, Internet companies that do not provide software 
compatible with the technology that visually disabled people use to 
access the Internet are liable for violating the ADA. The Note concludes 
with a summary of the first litigation on this issue between the National 
Federation of the Blind and America Online which was settled in July of 
2000. 
The shameful wall of exclusion must finally come tumbling down and make 
way for a bright new era of equality, independence and freedom. 
-President George Bush, 19901 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 26, 1990, in front of a gathering of more than three 
thousand onlookers, President George Bush signed into law the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 2 The chief Senate sponsor of 
the bill, Senator Tom Harkin, later wrote that "the ADA has taken its 
place among the great civil rights laws in our country's history."3 
Senator Edward Kennedy called the bill "an emancipation proclama-
tion for people with disabilities."4 The ADA is a federal remedial stat-
ute whose purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
* Book Review Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2001-2002). 
I Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans with 
Disabilities, 43 EMORY LJ. 245, 246 (1994). 
2 See MARC D. STOLMAN, A GUIDE TO LEGAL RIGHTS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABIUTIES 2 
(1994). 
5 See Senator Tom Harkin, The Americans with Disabilities Act Ten Years Later: A Framework 
for the Future, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1575 (2000). 
4 See STOLMAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
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mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social 
mainstream of American life.5 This Note will argue that just as the 
ADA has helped many disabled Americans in areas of public accom-
modations, it is also applicable to help the visually disabled access pri-
vate commercial Internet sites. 
There are now approximately one billion web pages on the 
Internet.6 A CNET special report found that ninety-eight percent of 
these websites are to some extent inaccessible to the visually disabled.' 
Yet even in the face of such adversity, approximately seventy-six per-
cent of disabled Americans have general access to the Internet, as 
compared with the approximately fifty percent of non-disabled 
Americans.s Unfortunately, even though much of the disabled com-
munity has general access to the Internet, visually disabled people of-
ten cannot effectively access most websites.9 
There are various reasons why the vast majority of websites are 
inaccessible to the visually disabled. Until recently, website designers 
largely ignored the plight of the visually disabled.1o As web design has 
become more graphically sophisticated, websites have become less 
accessible to the blind.l1 The accessibility problem is largely due to 
the fact that technology utilized by the visually disabled relies strictly 
on textual data from websites.12 The blind currently use two main 
technologies in conjunction with the Internet: screen readers that 
convert text to voice and refreshable Braille displays that convert 
scanned documents into Braille on a Braille pad.13 The mechanical 
aspects of how these technologies work are discussed in the last sec-
tion of this Note. 
5 See id. at 6; Mary Gannon, The Arne1icans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its Effect upon 
Employment Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 315, 316 (1991); Dana Whitehead McKee & Deborah 
Fleischaker, ADA and the Internet: Must Websites Be Accessible, 33 MD. BAR]. 34, 35 (2000). 
6 See Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Toolfor the RightJob, 2VAND.J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 191, 
195 (2000). . 
7 See Sally McGrane, Is the Web Truly Accessible to the Disabled?, at http://home.cnet.com/ 
specialreports/0-6014-7-1530073.html (Jan. 26, 2000). CNET Networks, Inc. (Nasdaq: 
CNET) , is the global source of information and commerce services for the technology 
industry. 
8 See id.; Maroney, supra note 6, at 192. 
9 See Maroney, supra note 6, at 192; McGrane, supra note 7. 
10 See McGrane, supra note 7. 
11 See id. 
12 See Curtis Chong, Making Your Website Accessible to the Blind, at http://www.nfb.org/ 
tech/webacc.htm (Oct. 17, 2000). 
13 Seeid. 
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The disabled community is now organizing its efforts to make the 
Internet more accessible.14 "We Media" launched the website "weme-
dia.com" in December of 1999, becoming the first commercial web-
site dedicated to the disabled population. I5 The website provides the 
disabled community with targeted information and resources in such 
areas as news, sports, and technology, all in a manner that is easily ac-
cessible to the visually disabled.I6 The creators of wemedia.com are 
aware that, according to the 1990 U.S. Census, the collective purchas-
ing power of the disabled community is growing, and that spending 
power will eventually put the computer industry on notice.l7 
In November 1999, the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), 
the leading advocacy group for the visually disabled, sued American 
Online (AOL), the nation's largest Internet provider.I8 The suit al-
leged that the AOL proprietary software was not compatible with the 
software required to translate computer signals into Braille or synthe-
sized speech.I9 In July 2000, the two groups settled the suit to allow 
AOL to create software with available screen-reader technologies.2o 
A broad reading of the public accommodations clause in Title 
11121 of the ADA suggests that public accommodations are not limited 
to strictly physical structures; therefore, nonphysical entities like the 
Internet also fall within the statute's purview.22 This interpretation of 
14 See About WeMedia Inc., at http://www.wemedia.com/wehome (last visited Mar .. 13, 
2002). 
15 See id. 
16 Seeid. 
17 SeeJoshua Harris Prager, People with Disabilities Are Next Consumer Niche, available at 
http://www.wemedia.com/wehome (Dec. 15, 1999). 
18SeeComplaint of National Federation of the Blind against America Online, available 
at http://www.libertyresources.org/ news/aoCl.html (last visited Apr. 12,2002) [hereinaf-
ter Complaint]; Barbara Pierce, NFB Sues AOL, at http://204.245.133.32/bm/bm99/bm99 
120l.htm (last visited Apr. 12,2002). 
19 SeeJonathan Bick, Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 ALB. LJ. SCI. & 
TECH. 205, 217 (2000); Pierce, sufrra note 18. 
20 See National Federation of the Blind/America Online Accessibility Agreement, available at 
http://www.nfb.org/Tech/accessibility.htm (Jut 26, 2000) [hereinafter Online Accessibility 
Agreement]; Bick, sUfrra note 19, at 222. 
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1990). The ADA is broken up into five areas: Title I concerns 
employment practices by units of state and local government; Title II addresses programs, 
services, and activities of state and local government; Title III deals with public accommo-
dations and commercial facilities; Title IV addresses telecommunication services; and Title 
V deals with miscellaneous provisions like construction, state immunity, attorney's fees, etc. 
Id. SeeBick, sufrra note 19, at 222 n.l. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 12181. See ~erally Bick, sufrra note 19; Karen Volkman, The Limits of Cov-
erage: Do Insurance Policies Obtained Through an Employer and Administered by Insurance Compa-
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Title III, in conjunction with supporting case law and the statute's leg-
islative history, implies that a broad reading of the ADA and its appli-
cability to the Internet is appropriate.23 Part I of this Note briefly 
summarizes the disability rights movement. Part II analyzes Title III of 
the ADA, including the statute's text, agency guidelines, and the legis-
lative history and purpose of the statute. Finally, Part III evaluates the 
National Federation of the Blind v. America Online, Inc. litigation, the first 
of potentially many lawsuits regarding Internet accessibility. This Note 
concludes that most barriers to accessibility on the Internet violate 
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
I. BACKGROUND ON DISABILITY RIGHTS 
A. Histurical Background 
For most of American history, disabled citizens have been the 
"hidden minority" in our society.24 The breadth of discrimination 
against the disabled is staggering in America. Experts estimate that 
between forty-three and fifty-four million Americans have some form 
of significant handicap.25 Whether due to lagging medical and tech-
nological progress or societal stigma, the United States government 
has ignored the plight of disabled Americans for many generations.26 
In fact, disability advocates heralded the passage of the ADA as the 
beginning of the "Third Reconstruction" due to its sweeping nature 
in remedying civil rights violations faced by the disabled.27 
The disability rights movement was virtually nonexistent until the 
second half of the twentieth century.28 Before then, society treated 
disabled people poorly, and placed most groups of disabled people in 
almshouses with criminals, the mentally challenged, and individuals 
nies Fall Within the Scope of Titre III of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 
249 (1999). 
25 See Bick, supra note 19, at 207. 
24 See Stephen Percy, Disability, Civil Rights and Public Policy (1989) (quoting POWER, 
PRIVILEGE, AND LAw: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 423 (Leslie Bender ed., 1995». 
25 See McKee & Fleischaker, supra note 5, at 35. See generally Matthew A. Stowe, Interpret-
ing "Place of Public Accommodation" Under Titre III of the ADA: A Technical Determination with 
Potentially Broad Civil Rights Implications, 50 DUKE LJ. 297 (2000). 
26 See Percy, supra note 24, at 423-25. 
27 SeeJeffrey A. Van Detta & Dr. Dan R. Gallipeau, Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Los-
ing Summary Judgment Motions, And Wooid They Fare Better Before a jury? A &sponse to Professor 
Colker, 19 REv. LITIG. 505, 507 (2000). 
28 See STOLMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
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with emotional problems.29 Dorothea Dix, an advocate for the dis-
abled throughout most of the nineteenth century, found people with 
mental illnesses and retardation in "cages, closets, cellars, and stalls 
... chained, naked, beaten with rods, and lashed into obedience. "30 
Although some members of Congress during the 1850s discussed leg-
islation providing federal funding and facilities for the disabled, espe-
cially the blind and deaf, President Franklin Pierce and subsequent 
politicians dismissed such federal intervention.31 Later, aid and char-
ity to the disabled focused on disabled veterans returning from World 
War 1.32 
The modern disability rights movement originated in the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s.33 Disabled citizens began to compare 
their situation with that of blacks in America.34 It was not until the 
1970s, however, that Congress passed the first significant piece of re-
medial legislation addressing disability rights.35 This legislation, Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, adopted much of its lan-
guage directly from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36 The Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 prohibited discrimination against persons with certain 
disabilities by recipients of federal financial assistance, including fed-
eral agencies.37 The Act had jurisdiction over only the federal gov-
ernment and private employers who received federal contracts.38 Al-
though this was the first federal legislation that directly protected 
people with disabilities from discrimination, it did not cover private 
employers who did not receive federal funding, therefore limiting its 
scope and effectiveness.39 However, much of the language of the ADA 
evolved from the earlier language and principles of the Rehabilitation 
Act. 40 
29 See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 59 (1993). 
W Seeid. 
~l See id. at 60. 
~2 See id. at 61. 
~~ SeeSTOLMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
~4 See id. 
~5 See id. at 4. 
36 29 U.S.C. § 704; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et. seq, see SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 65; Bick, su-
pranote 19, at 212; Gannon, supra note 5, at 318. 
~7 See Gannon, supra note 5, at 317. 
38 See id. at 320-21. 
~9 See Allison Duncan, Defining Disability in the ADA: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 60 
LA. L. REv. 967, 968 (2000); Gannon, supra note 5, at 321. 
40 See Gannon, supra note 5, at 321. The definition of disability in § 3(2) of the ADA is 
very similar to § 7(8) (B) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990); 29 
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B. The Americans with Disabilities Ad 
Seventeen years later, Congress passed the ADA to broaden the 
protections first set forth in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to persons 
with disabilities in private sector employment (Title I), to those who 
use public services (Title II), to enable access to public accommoda-
tions (Title III), and to telecommunications (Title IV) .41 The ADA 
defines "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] indi-
vidual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment. "42 
Title III of the ADA is the most relevant section for this discus-
sion.43 Title III focuses on tile ADA's definition of and the rules be-
hind public accommodations.44 The main purpose of this section was 
to extend the protections provided in Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 to the private sector, bringing a larger percentage of 
individuals with disabilities into the "economic and social main-
stream" of society.45 Through Title III, Congress attempted to accom-
plish this goal by providing "equal access to the array of establish-
ments," i.e. "public accommodations," available to the non-disabled 
members of society.46 To this end, Title III prohibits any private entity 
from discriminating against an individual on the basis of a disability in 
the individual's "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation of any place of pub-
lic accommodation" owned, leased, or operated by that entity.47 Cir-
cuit courts are currently split as to what constitutes a "service" and a 
U.S.C. § 706 (8) (b) (1988). See id. The definition of handicap in § 7(8)(B) of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 is as follows: 
any person who: 
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or 
more of such person's major life activities, 
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or 
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 
29 U.S.C. § 706 (8) (b); see Gannon, supra note 5, at 321 n.64. 
4142 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; see Bick, supra note 19, at 213. 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102; Senator Larry E. Craig, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Pro-
logue, Promise, Product, and Perforrnance, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 205, 210 (1999). 
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. 
44 See Volkman, supra note 22, at 254. 
45 See H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990); Volkman, supra note 22, at 253. 
46 See S. REp. No. 116, at 59 (1990); Volkman, supra note 22, at 253. 
4742 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see Craig, supra note 42, at 211. 
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"place of public accommodation."48 Title III further requires private 
entities to remove discriminatory barriers to the disabled if such re-
moval is "readily achievable."49 However, entities do not have to re-
move such barriers if "making such modifications would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, or 
accommodations. "50 
II. ANALYSIS OF TITLE III 
The central question in analyzing the applicability of Title III to 
the Internet is whether the term "place of public accommodation" is 
narrowly limited to physical places/structures or whether it encom-
passes something more.51 An examination of the plain language of 
Title Ill's text, the applicability of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 
guidelines on the subject, legislative history, and case law and dicta on 
the subject support a broad reading of the public accommodation 
provision.52 In particular, two important court of appeals cases, the 
First Circuit in Cmparts Distrilmtion Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's 
Ass'n of New England, Inc. and Judge Posner's decision from the Sev-
enth Circuit in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., address the above 
factors critical to determining the contours of Title III protection.53 
A. Statutory Text 
An analysis of Title III, like any other statute, begins with examin-
ing the "plain language of the statute. "54 In broad language, Title III 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act states that "no individual shall 
be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the . . . services, ... privileges, advantages, or accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation. "55 Thus, in order to 
argue that Internet sites must be made accessible to the blind under 
48 See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 
1994). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii); see Craig, supra note 42, at 211. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii); see Craig, supra note 42, at 211. 
51 See Stowe, supra note 25, at 298. 
52 See gmeraUy Bick, supra note 19. 
53 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., 
Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). 
54 See BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983); Cmparts, 37 F.3d 
at 19; Maroney, supra note 6, at 195. 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990); Bick, supra note 19, at 219. 
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the ADA, one must first establish that the Internet is a place of public 
accommodation under Title 111.56 Title III defines private entities as 
public accommodations for the purposes of Title III "if the operations 
of such entities affect commerce. "57 The statute then lists several pri-
vate entity-public accommodations, including places of "exhibition 
and entertainment, a sales and rental establishment ... a service es-
tablishmen t ... and a place of recreation. "58 
The language of Title Ill's public accommodation terms-"travel 
service," an "insurance office," and "other service establishments"-
suggest that the plain meaning of the statute is not solely limited to 
physical structures.59 Nothing in Title III explicitly states that public 
accommodations are solely physical entities which a person must be 
able to enter or "brick and mortar businesses" and facilities, as one 
commentator has suggested.6o Furthermore, the First Circuit in Car-
parts concluded that "the plain meaning of the terms" do not require 
public accommodations to be physical structures.61 The Carparts court 
found the language of the statute ambiguous and suggested looking 
to agency regulations, the legislative history of the ADA, and public 
policy concerns surrounding the passage of the ADA to determine its 
plain meaning.62 
The First Circuit took a pragmatic approach in explaining why 
Title III is not strictly limited to physical structures.63 Instead of stating 
only physical entities, the public accommodations definition lists serv-
ices such as "travel services" that imply a broader set of entities.64 The 
First Circuit highlighted that travel services often conduct business by 
telephone or correspondence without requiring their customers to 
physically enter an office to obtain such services.65 The court noted 
that "Congress [must have] clearly contemplated" such a service.66 
The Court reasoned that it would be "irrational to conclude that per-
sons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the 
ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the telephone 
56 See Bick, supra note 19, at 219; McKee & Fleischaker, supra note 5, at 35. 
57 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); see Bick, supra note 19, at 220. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7) (f); see Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
60 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19; Maroney, supra note 6, at 194. 
61 See 37 F.3d at 19. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
2002] Applicability of the ADA to Internet Sites 397 
or by mail are not. "67 The court went as far as to state that "Congress 
could not have intended such an absurd result. "68 
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, in dicta, took an 
even stronger position that the plain meaning of the statute favors not 
limiting Title III of the ADA to physical structures.69 Posner reasoned 
that the "core meaning [of public accommodation], plainly enough, 
is that the owner or operator of a store ... , travel agency, Web site, or 
other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space), that is 
open to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering 
the facility. "70 In dicta, the Seventh Circuit is the first appellate court 
to explicitly state that the public accommodations definition in Title 
III of the ADA applies to the Internet.71 
In contrast to the First and Seventh Circuits' findings that the 
plain language of Title III does not require public accommodations to 
be physical structures, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance utilized the canons of noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis to hold otherwise.72 The Sixth Circuit's divided en banc 
decision in Parker represents the most critical attack on Carparts'tex-
tual analysis of Title III of the ADA and provides the framework for 
the argument that public accommodations are limited to physical 
structures.73 
Parker addressed whether a benefit plan provided by an em-
ployer's insurance company falls under Title Ill's public accommoda-
tions provision.74 The Sixth Circuit answered in the negative, conclud-
ing that Title III applies only to the clients and customers of public 
accommodations and that public accommodations are only physical 
67 See id. 
68 See id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals and numerous district courts have also 
followed the approach of Cmparts in broadly interpreting Title III of the ADA. See Pallozzi 
v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "Title III's mandate 
that the disabled be accorded 'full and equal e~oyment of the goods, [and] services ... of 
any place of public accommodation,' suggests to us that the statute was meant to guarantee 
them more than mere physical access."); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. 
Supp.299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ius. Co., 927 F. Supp.1316, 
1321-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp.2d 557, 561-63 (D. 
Minn. 1988). 
69 See Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997); Maroney, supra note 6, at 195, 198. 
7~ See Maroney, supra note 6, at 195. The Sixth Circuit's en banc decision contained 
two different dissents which were joined by three other judges. See Parker v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). 
74 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-14. 
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places.75 In making this determination, the Sixth Circuit majority in-
voked the canon of noscitur a sociis to reject the expansion of Title 
III. 76 Noscitur a sociis means that "a term is interpreted within the con-
text of the accompanying words to avoid the giving of unintended 
breadth to the Acts of Congress. "77 In applying this canon to Title III, 
the Sixth Circuit highlighted that "every term listed in § 12181 (7) and 
subsection (F) is a physical place open to public access. "78 Thus, the 
court reasoned that although the term public accommodations itself 
is vague, the fact that every other term in the statute represented a 
physical structure means that public accommodations are limited to 
physical structures.79 
The Sixth Circuit also attacked the First Circuit's reasoning in 
interpreting Title Ill's "other service establishments" as meaning both 
physical and nonphysical places.8o One commentator used the canon 
of ejusdem generis to explain the Sixth Circuit's rationale.81 This canon 
states that ''when general words follow an enumeration of specific 
words, the general words are to be read as applying only to the same 
general kind or class as the specific words. "82 According to this logic, 
the fact that each term listed in Section 12181 (7) (F) is a physical 
place means that the more vague catch-all term, "other service estab-
lishments" also refers to physical places.83 The Parker majority found 
that the plain meaning of the statute could be construed from "the 
clear connotation of the words in Section 12181 (7) that a public ac-
commodation is a physical place open to public access. "84 
The Parker decision created a split in the circuits concerning the 
definition of Title Ill's public accommodations c1ause.85 However, the 
Supreme Court has yet to grant a writ of certiorari to a case on this 
issue as one of the dissenting judges in Parker suggested.86 Since the 
75 See id. at 1010-11; Volkman, supra note 22, at 267. 
76 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014. 
77 See Maroney, supra note 6, at 195-96. 
78 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014; Maroney, supra note 6, at 196. 
79 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014; Maroney, supra note 6, at 196. 
80 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1990); Carparts., 37 F.3d at 19; Maroney, supra note 6, 
at 198. 
B! See Maroney, supra note 6, at 198. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7); Volkman, supra note 22, at 268. 
85 Seel21 F.3d at 1014; Volkman, supra note 22, at 269. 
86 See 121 F.3d at 1022 (Merrit, J., dissenting); Volkman, supra note 22, at 270-7l. 
Judge Merritt, in a caustic dissent, writes: 
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Parker decision, lower courts have aligned themselves with either the 
First or the Sixth Circuit's differing views on the definition of public 
accommodation.87 Thus, the plain language of the statute, the starting 
point for any statutory analysis, does not provide a clear definition of 
public accommodation in Title III of the ADA.88 
In a literal reading, the statute is at best ambiguous.89 However, 
the simple reasoning and logic of both the First and Seventh Circuits 
support the conclusion that Congress likely meant for the public ac-
commodations provision to be defined broadly, rather than strictly 
limited to physical structures.90 The plain meaning of Title III, as 
viewed by the First and Seventh Circuit, is that the disabled cannot be 
excluded from certain goods, services, and facilities.91 The Sixth Cir-
cuit instead found meaning in an ambiguous statute through legal 
canons without placing any weight on the purpose of the statute.92 
This narrow approach ignores other important methods of statutory 
interpretation such as administrative agency review and legislative his-
tory. 
The Court limits [public accommodation] to physical access to an office, re-
jecting the contrary view of the other circuit and district courts that have de-
cided the issue, as well rejecting the Department of Justice and the EEOC 
view that employer group health insurance is covered. In the end, the un-
necessary conflict between these two views will now have to be resolved by the 
Supreme Court. 
See id. at 1021. However, the Supreme Court has yet to grant a writ of certiorari to such a 
test case. 
87 See Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 31-33; Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3rd 
Cir. 1998) (finding that Title III restricts public accommodations to physical places); Clou-
tier, 964 F. Supp. at 302 (rejecting the insurer's argument that applicant lacked standing 
for an ADA claim because it only prohibited discrimination in providing physical access to 
public accommodations); Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1321-22 (finding that plaintiffs are not 
required to be physically present in a physical accommodation to proceed with a disability 
claim); Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 561-63 (finding that an insurance office is a public ac-
commodation according to Title III of the ADA); see also Volkman, supra note 22, at 271. 
88 See Cmparts, 37 F.3d at 19; Bick, supra note 19, at 215. 
89 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
90 See Mutual ojOmaha, 179 F.3d at 559; Cmparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
91 See Mutual oj Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559; Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
92 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-14. 
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B. Department of Justice and Other Federal Agent)' Guidelines 
1. Department of Justice's Advisory Letter 
The ADA provides the Attorney General with the power to issue 
regulations interpreting Title 111.93 Specifically, Section 12186(b) 
states "the Attorney General shall issue regulations in an accessible 
format to carry out the provisions of this Title ... that include stan-
dards applicable to facilities. "94 In 1996, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) issued a statement in the form of an advisory letter to Senator 
Tom Harkin explaining that the ADA will cover entities on the Inter-
net whose services are deemed to be public accommodations.95 In the 
letter, the DOJ stated that "covered entities that use the Internet for 
communications regarding their programs, goods, or services must be 
prepared to offer those communications through accessible means as 
well. ''96 Deval Patrick, the Assistant Attorney General who wrote the 
advisory opinion, specifically mentioned providing the "web page in-
formation in text format" as one available option to assist in ensuring 
accessibility for the visually disabled.97 The letter, although suggesting 
that the Internet is a covered entity applicable to the public accom-
modation clause of Title III, does not explicitly state that the Internet 
is a public accommodation, nor does it mention the current debate 
on whether public accommodations are limited to physical struc-
tures.98 
Regulations and advisory opinions by federal agencies deserve to 
be accorded the proper weight.99 The Supreme Court in Chevron, 
US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. held that when ana-
lyzing the importance of administrative interpretations of legislation, 
the respective agency must yield to the "unambiguous congressional 
intent of the statute. "100 However, if the text is ambiguous, courts must 
93 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1990); see Maroney, supra note 6, at 201. 
94 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1990); see Maroney, supra note 6, at 201. 
95 See Bick, supra note 19, at 206; Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, to Senator Tom Harkin, at http://www.usdoj.gov./ crt/foia/ cltr204.txt (Sept. 9, 1996) 
[hereinafter DO] Letter]. This letter, #204, was written by Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attor-
ney General of the Civil Rights Division. The letter was in response to a constituent inquiry 
regarding accessibility of "web pages" on the Internet to people with visual disabilities. See 
id. 
96 See DO] Letter, supra note 95. 
97 See id. 
98 See id; Maroney, supra note 6, at 201. 
99 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865 (1984). 
100 See id; Maroney, supra note 6, at 201. 
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defer to agency interpretations of a statute.101 As previously deter-
mined, the plain language of Title III is ambiguous on whether the 
definition of public accommodation is limited to a physical struc-
ture.1°2 The public policy behind the Chevron instruction is that when 
the statutory text is unintentionally vague, the decision of the respec-
tive agency deserves deference because of the agency's expertise in its 
particular field.103 
2. Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998 
The federal government took a major step towards instituting 
mandatory technological accessibility to the visually disabled when 
Congress passed Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1998 (Section 508).104 Section 508 aims to make the federal gov-
ernment's technologies more accessible to the disabled. 105 Section 
508, borrowing language from the ADA, requires that when a federal 
agency uses electronic and information technology, it must ensure 
that this electronic and information technology is accessible to all. 106 
Specifically, Section 508(a) (2) (A) mandates that the Architectural 
and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) pub-
lish standards setting forth a definition of electronic and information 
technology, and the technical and functional performance criteria 
necessary for accessibility for such technology.107 One commentator 
noted that the implementation of Section 508 will likely "spur innova-
tion through the e-commerce industry. ,,108 Although Section 508 does 
not require private companies to make their technologies accessible 
to the disabled, the statute is a step in the right direction and a sign 
that Federal agencies are serious about the accessibility of the Inter-
net for the disabled. I09 
The Section 508 guidelines will likely cause the Supreme Court to 
soon become involved in resolving the conflict over the applicability 
101 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Maroney, supra note 6, at 201. 
102 See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. 
103 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
104 29 U.S.C. § 794d (1998); see Bick, supra note 19, at 222. 
105 See Bick, supra note 19, at 222. 
106 See id. Section 508 adopts the "undue burden" standard which is found in Title III 
of the ADA and is equivalent to the term ''undue hardship" in Title I of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii) (1990); seeBick, supra note 19, at 223. 
107 29 U.S.C. § 794d; see Bick, supra note 19, at 222. 
108 See Peter David Blanck & Leonard A. Sandler, ADA Title III and the Internet: Technol-
ogy and Civil Rights, 24 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REp. 855, 857 (2000). 
109 29 U.S.C. § 794d; see Bick, supm note 19, at 222-24. 
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of the ADA to the Internet.110 According to one commentator, the 
Access Board's proposed accessibility requirements will set a standard 
for ADA compliance in electronic and information technology.111 
More importantly, it will create a perception that a standard good 
enough for the government should also apply to the private sector.1l2 
3. National Council on Disability 
In February 2000, the chair of another federal agency, the Na-
tional Council on Disability (NCD), testified before the House Judici-
ary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, that Title III of 
the ADA applies to the Internet. ll3 The NCD is an independent fed-
eral agency that makes recommendations to both the President and 
Congress on issues affecting Americans with disabilities.1l4 The NCD 
was an integral force in the legislative struggle to draft and enact the 
ADA, and still monitors its enforcement and effectiveness today.l15 In 
its presentation before the Subcommittee, the NCD conceded that 
nowhere in the statute or legislative history is the applicability to the 
Internet explicitly mentioned; however, the NCD highlighted that the 
list of entities described as public accommodations in Title III "is 
broad, and includes ... almost the entire range of entities, activities, 
goods, and services with which average individuals may come into 
contact ... in the course of their daily lives. "1l6 In addition, the NCD 
argued that coupled with the proliferation of the Internet will be the 
decline of more traditional "places of public accommodations."117 For 
example, people may shop less frequently at department stores if they 
can purchase similar items more conveniently online.llS This change 
will lead to even more traditional services being denied to the dis-
abled if the Internet remains inaccessible.1l9 
110 See Bick, supra note 19, at 209. 
l11 29 U.S.C. § 794d; see Bick, supra note 19, at 210. 
112 See Bick, supra note 19, at 210. 
113 See Marca Bristo, The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Private Internet 
Sites, at http://www.ncd.gov /newsroom/testimony/bristo_2-17-00.hunl (Feb. 17,2000). 
114 See National Council on Disability, at http://www.ncd.gov/index.hunl (last visited 
Mar. 17,2002). 
115 See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PuBUC 
LAw 101-336 THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILTIES ACT, H. REp. No. 102-A, at 630 (1990) 
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1; National Council on Disability, supra, note 114. 
116 See Bristo, supra note 113. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
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The NCD directly attacked the logic of those who believe that a 
"place of public accommodation" must be a physical structure,120 Ex-
panding on the First Circuit's example in Cmparts, the NCD created a 
hypothetical situation in which there are two travel agencies, both of 
which explicitly state that they will not take people with disabilities as 
customers,121 One travel agency does business in an office, the other 
agency conducts business strictly over the phone.122 The Sixth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of "place of public accommodation" would unin-
tentionally legitimatize the discrimination of the travel agency that 
conducts business over the phone.123 It would be "absurd" to think 
that Congress would impose such a heavy burden on some businesses 
while leaving similar businesses unregulated by the ADA.124 
There are many federal agencies that believe the time has come 
for Title III of the ADA to regulate the Internet.I25 In light of Chevron, 
when the plain meaning of a statute is vague or ambiguous, the courts 
must give proper weight and deference to governmental agency opin-
ions,126 The advisory letter by the DO], the passage of Section 508 and 
consequently the creation of the Access Board, and finally the testi-
mony from the NCD all support the argument that Title III governs 
private Internet sites.127 
C. Legislative History and Purpose of the ADA 
Considering Congress drafted the ADA in the late 1980s, it is ob-
vious that very few, if any, legislators or their staffs contemplated that 
the language in Title III would include the Internet as a public ac-
commodation,128 Nevertheless, most legal scholars would agree that 
legislative intent and legislative history contribute significantly to a 
court's interpretation of the statute.129 The extent and weight that 
120 See id. 
121 See Bristo, supra note 116. 
122 See id. 
12~ See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Bristo, supra note 113. 
124 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1021 (Merrit,j., dissenting); Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19; Bristo, su-
pra note 116. 
125 SeeBristo, supra note 113; DO] Letter, supra note 95. 
126 See 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
127 29 U.S.C. § 794d (1998); see DO] Letter, supra note 95; Bristo, supra note 113. 
128 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1990); The World Wide Web was created in 1991. See PBS Life on 
the Internet, at http://www.pbs.org/internet/timeline (last visited Mar. 17, 2002). 
129 SeeWn.LIAM N. ESKRIDGE,]R. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEG-
ISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 743 (2d ed. 1995); Ryan P. 
Healy, Mitigating Measures and the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities 
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courts should give legislative histories, however, is an academic debate 
that is still unresolved by the Supreme Court.130 The First Circuit in 
Carparts utilized the legislative intent and history of the ADA to justify 
their broad interpretation of the public accommodation clause.l3l 
The Sixth Circuit in Parker, however, chose not to evaluate the legisla-
tive history of Title III of the ADAl32 Instead, the court held that the 
plain meaning of the statute is clear through the use of the noscitur a 
sociis doctrine and therefore no assessment of the legislative history 
was warranted.133 Thus, not only is there a debate between the use of 
legislative histories in statutory interpretation, but there is also a de-
bate concerning the true legislative intent of the ADA134 An examina-
tion of this subject reveals that legislative history is very relevant to 
statutory interpretation, and more specifically, that a broad reading of 
the legislative history of the ADA supports the theory that the Inter-
net is a public accommodation and subject to Title III of the ADA135 
1. Legislative History as a Tool of Statutory Interpretation 
The legislative history of a statute is documented through the 
evolution of a bill as it passes through Congress.136 Some of the mate-
rials that make up a legislative history are floor debate, prepared 
statements by interests groups and members of Congress upon sub-
mission of a bill on the floor or in committee hearings, committee 
reports, transcripts of committee hearings, and recorded votes.137 
Courts, however, attribute varying levels of significance to different 
legislative history materials.138 Most courts recognize committee re-
ports as authoritative legislative history and give them the greatest 
weight as representing the intent of Congress.139 The rationale of the 
courts is that legislation is mainly drafted in congressional commit-
Act of 1990-A Case ofludicial Myopia? Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999), 35 
LAND & WATER L. REv. 211, 227 (2000). 
130 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 733. 
m See 37 F.3d at 19-20. 
132 See 121 F.3d at 1014 n.lO. 
133 See id. Note, however, that Justice Meritt in his dissent argues that the majority ig-
nores the legislative intent of the ADA. See id. at 1021 (Meritt,]., dissenting). 
134 See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014 n.lO; Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19-20; ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, 
supra note 129, at 733. 
135 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1990); see Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19-20; ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra 
note 129, at 733. 
136 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 733. 
137 See id; OTTO HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 202 (1980). 
138 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 733. 
139 See id. at 743. 
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tees, and therefore the committee members and their staffs are the 
people most able to articulate the purpose of a bill.140 Courts also give 
lesser weight to statements made in committee hearings and floor de-
bates.HI The courts usually give credence only to individual members 
of Congress when he or she is a bill's main sponsor; assuming that 
places them in a better position to understand and represent the pur-
pose and intent of the legislation, as opposed to another member of 
Congress who is only one voice out of 535.142 
Although most courts find legislative history useful in ascertain-
ing the purpose and congressional intent of statutes, the recent 
movement among jurists, led by Justice Scalia, challenges the tradi-
tional reliance on legislative history and relies instead on a textualist 
philosophy.H3 Like the court in Parker, strict textualists argue that one 
needs only to examine the plain meaning of the statute. I44 Textualists 
also warn of the interpretative dangers of legislative history due to 
growing influence of congressional staffs and lobbyists involved in the 
actual drafting of the statutes.145 
Justice Breyer, one of the leading jurists opposing the textualist 
movement, and many other legal scholars believe that legislative his-
tories are very useful in interpreting statutes that contain ambiguous 
language. I46 One advocate of the use oflegislative histories, District of 
Columbia Circuit Judge Patricia Wald, appropriately points out that 
one obvious reason Congress makes legislative histories available 
through committee reports is so that judges can use them when in-
140 See id. Experts in this field report that over a forty-year period, over 60% of the Su-
preme Court's citations to legislative history were references to committee reports. ESK-
RIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 743;Jorge L. Carro & Andrew Brann, The U.S. Supreme 
Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETERICS]. 294, 304 
(1982). 
141 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 773. 
142 Seeid. 
14~ See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia,]., dissenting); Ernest 
Gellhorn,Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 755, 758 
(1995). 
144 See 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Gellhorn, supra note 143, at 758. 
145 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 743-44; Gellhorn, supra note 143, at 
758. In a recent opinion, Justice Scalia quoted another judge who described the use of 
legislative history as "the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over 
the heads of the guests for one's friends." See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) 
(Scalia,]., concurring). 
146 See Gellhorn, supra note 143, at 758-59. 
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terpreting the respective statutes.147 Notable jurists such as the late 
Judge Learned Hand and Judge Richard Posner support the principle 
of "imaginative reconstruction" in which judges act as "congressional 
agents" when confronted with an ambiguous statute in order to "think 
his way as best he can into the mind of the enacting legislators and 
imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at 
bar."148 
The language and explicit intent of Title III of the ADA as ap-
plied to the Internet is ambiguous on at least two levels: the unclear 
definition of "public accommodation" and the fact that the Internet 
was not a readily available social and economic outlet in 1990.149 
Without completely ignoring the criticism of the textualist approach, 
a broad reading of the legislative history of Title III as supported by 
Justice Breyer and Judge Posner's "imaginative reconstruction" will 
help the courts better ascertain whether the 10Ist Congress would 
have defined the Internet as a public accommodation,15o 
2. Legislative History of Title III 
The first sentence of the voluminous legislative history of the 
ADA, beginning with the purpose of the statute "to establish a clear 
and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity," is neither clear nor comprehensive as the courts have struggled 
with the statute's ambiguities and cut back on its scope.151 The 
"[p]urpose" of the ADA sets the tone for the intent of Congress 
throughout the entire statute.152 Section 2(b)(l) calls for a "national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities"; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent ... standards ad-
dressing discrimination .... (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional 
authority ... and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major ar-
eas of discrimination. "153 Congress articulated its commitment to end-
ing discrimination with powerful words to send a message that dis-
147 See Edward Heath, How Federal Judges Use Legislative History, 25 J. LEGIS. 95, 102 
(1999); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleep: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes 
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 2S6 (1990). 
148 See Heath, supra note 147, at 9S; Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Class-
room and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. SOO, S17-22 (19S3). 
149 42 U.S.C. § 121S1 (7) (1990); see PBS Life on the Internet, supra note 12S. 
150 42 U.S.C. § 121S1; see Heath, supra note 147, at 9S; Posner, supra note 14S, at S17. 
151 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (emphasis added). 
152Id. 
153Id. § 12101 (b) (1)-(4) (emphasis added). 
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crimination in America would no longer be tolerated. I54 The First 
Circuit reiterated this message in Carparts. I55 The court quoted the 
above general purpose and more specifically the explicit purpose of 
Title III which is "to bring individuals with disabilities into the eco-
nomic and social mainstream of American life. "156 Since mainstream 
America uses the Internet for both economic and recreational pur-
poses, the above goal of Title III cannot be met without ensuring ac-
cess to the Internet for all Americans,157 
In approaching the interpretation of the committee reports in a 
broad and expansive manner as advocated by Justice Breyer and his 
followers, there is substantial evidence that the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Human Resources intended for Title III of the ADA to be 
expansive enough to apply to services such as the Internet. I5S The 
Committee heard much testimony from various interest groups, peo-
ple with disabilities, members of Congress, and groups associated with 
businesses.I59 The Senate Committee was well informed of the plight 
of disabled Americans, including the particular challenges faced by 
the visually disabled,160 The Committee Report provided detailed ex-
planations of the various provisions of the ADA and noted that the 
section describing public accommodations only lists a "few examples" 
of entities, and that the Committee "intend [ed] " for the catch-all 
phrase "other similar" entities to be "construed liberally consistent 
with the intent of the legislation that people with disabilities should 
have equal access to the array of establishments that are available to 
others who do not currently have disabilities. "161 
A critic of this thesis might argue that the word "establishments" 
refers to "physical entities;" however, proponents would counter that 
the use of "imaginative reconstruction" would be more appropriate in 
this case because Congress was not aware that the Internet would be-
come such an integral part of mainstream American society.I62 The 
154 Id. 
155 See 37F.3d 12, 19 (lstCir.1994). 
156 See id.; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 100. 
157 See Bick, supra note 19, at 207. 
158 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 99-116; Bick, supra note 19, at 207; 
Gellhorn, supra note 146, at 758-59. On August 2, 1989, the Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources voted favorably 16-0 on S. 933 which was sponsored by Senator Tom 
Harkin (D-Iowa). See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 99-100. 
159 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 102. 
160 See id. On May 9, 1989, Mr. Joseph Danowsky, an attorney who is blind, spoke before 
the Committee. See id. 
161 Seeid. at 157. 
162 See id; Posner, supra note 148, at 817. 
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Committee further elaborated on the "intent of the legislation" only 
one page later in specifying that it is "discriminatory to subject an in-
dividual or class of individuals on the basis of [a] disability ... to a 
denial of the opportunity of the class to participate in or benefit from 
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions of an entity. "163 "Construed liberally," with the use of "imagina-
tive reconstruction," courts can reasonably interpret the intent of 
Congress to prevent discrimination towards the visually disabled on 
the Internet, even if one strictly defines the Internet as a means to 
access "goods, services, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. "164 
Section 302(b)(2)(A)(i) of Title III defines "discrimination" as 
including the application of eligibility criteria that "tend to screen out 
... any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally en-
joying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, and advantages, and 
accommodations . . . unless such criteria can be shown to be neces-
sary. "165 In explaining what constitutes violations of Title III, the 
Committee presented a hypothetical in which it would be a violation 
for a grocery store to create a rule barring blind persons from the 
store.166 Ten years after the passage of the ADA, on-line grocery store 
services are effectively "screening out" a "class of individuals," the 
visually disabled, by not making their websites accessible to screen 
reader software. Although e-commerce sites are not creating per se 
"rules" that prohibit blind people from utilizing their services, they 
are constructively banning them from their services by not making 
reasonable modifications to their websites.167 
The Committee Report further supports such a liberal interpre-
tation in prohibiting the "imposition of criteria that 'tend to' screen 
out an individual with a disability ... by imposing policies that dimin-
ish such individuals' chances of participation. "168 The same section of 
Title III expands the definition of "discrimination" by including the 
"failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no indi-
vidual with a disability is excluded, denied services ... because of the 
absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demon-
163 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 158. 
164 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1990). See generally Bick, supranore 19. 
165 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 160. 
166 See id. 
167 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (ii). 
168 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranore 115, at 160. 
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strate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the ... services being offered or would result in an undue burden. "169 
As explained in the next section of this Note, it is certainly not an 
undue burden for service-based websites to become accessible to the 
visually disabled. I70 More significantly, the ambiguous nature of the 
term "entity" in combination with more specific terms like "auxiliary 
aids" can be liberally construed to cover access to the Internet for the 
visually disabled. I7I 
One example used by the Committee to describe how entities can 
provide auxiliary aids is the acquisition or modification of equipment 
or devices used in museums such as audio tapes and brailled materi-
als.172 Eleven years later, it is only a small step to equate these types of 
auxiliary aids with websites that provide services with an option to 
read the text in Braille or listen to an audio recording.173 More 
significantly, the Committee even suggested the possibility of techno-
logical advances affecting the disabled communityP4 Using strong 
language, the Committee expressed its wish "to make it clear that 
technological advances can be expected to further enhance options 
for making meaningful and effective opportunities available to indi-
viduals with disabilities .... Such advances may enable covered enti-
ties to provide auxiliary aids and services. "175 The above language il-
lustrates that the Committee was aware that technological advances 
could indeed affect the disabled, and the Committee wanted to en-
courage entities to adapt to such advancesP6 
As discussed earlier, although remarks by individual members of 
Congress are not as authoritative as committee reports, they can still 
signity the intent of the voting bodies.!77 Obviously, no legislators ex-
plicitly mentioned ADA applicability to the Internet, but a cursory 
examination of the floor debates of the statute reveals a belief in the 
ADA's expansive scope. I78 It is also important to note that members of 
the 101 st Congress heard testimony by witnesses describing why dis-
169 See id. at 161. 
170 See Bick, supra note 19, at 217; Chong, supra note 12; see also infra Part III. 
171 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 161. 
172 See id. at 162. 
m SeeChong, supra note 12. 
174 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 162-63. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 129, at 773. 
178 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 619-30; Bick, supra note 19, at 216. 
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abled individuals do not frequent places of public accommodation.I79 
One commentator noted that witnesses identified the major areas of 
discrimination faced by disabled people-not all concerning physical 
access--and thus Congress was aware of discrimination beyond 
merely the lack of access to physical places of public accommoda-
tion.I80 
In a speech on the House floor, Congresswoman Jolene Unsoeld 
railed against society depriving the disabled of "access to [the] mar-
ketplace as a waste of human resources. "181 She focused on the visually 
disabled's spending power that would contribute to the Internet's 
marketplace.I82 More specifically, Congressman Edward Markey 
defined public accommodation as "businesses open to the public. "183 
He viewed the passage of the ADA as "an extraordinary opportunity 
to bring [the forty-three million Americans with disabilities] into the 
mainstream of American life. "184 A portion of those forty-three million 
disabled Americans include the visually disabled, and eleven years af-
ter the passage of the ADA, most people would agree that the Internet 
is incorporated into the mainstream of American life.I85 Thus "busi-
nesses open to the public" on the Internet must be accessible to the 
visually disabled. 
Senator Tom Harkin expressed another sign of the future 
flexibility of the ADA when discussing the role of the National Coun-
cil on Disability (NCD) in shaping the effectiveness of the ADA.I86 
Senator Harkin articulated that the NCD has a particular "expertise" 
that should be shared with the Attorney General so that the "covered 
entities are assisted in understanding their roles and responsibilities 
under the law."187 Following Senator Harkin's remarks, Senator Daniel 
Inouye concurred and stated that the NCD has "a unique perspective 
to bring to the debate and we want to make clear that we fully intend 
that the Attorney General consult them in this capacity. "188 As men-
179 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 102-03. 
180 See Jill L. Schultz, The Impact of Titk III of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Emplnyer-
Provided Insurance Plans: Is the Insurance Company Subject to Liability?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
343,372 (1999). 
181 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 623. 
182 See Prager, supra note 17. 
185 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 624. 
184 See id. 
185 SeeBick, supra note 19, at 207. 
186 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 630. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
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tioned previously, the Chair of the NCD in February 2000 testified 
before the House Judiciary Committee advocating that the ADA was 
indeed applicable to the Internet.189 
On February 9, 2000, the House Subcommittee on the Constitu-
tion of the Committee on the Judiciary added to the post-legislative 
history of the ADA by conducting a hearing entitled, "Applicability of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act To Private Internet Sites. "190 Mem-
bers <?f two panels spoke at length regarding both the technical as-
pects of web accessibility to the disabled and the legal and policy 
questions concerning ADA applicability to the Internet.I9l The chair-
person of the subcommittee invited speakers representing both sides 
of the issue and unfortunately no consensus formed.I92 In any event, 
even if the applicability of the ADA to the Internet was not on the 
minds of the legislators who drafted the statute in 1990, it is undoubt-
edly on their minds now. 
III. CASE STUDY: NATIONAL FEDERA TION FOR THE BLIND V. AMERICA 
ONLINE, INC. 
A. The Lawsuit 
One of the first major tests of the ADA's applicability to the 
Internet began in November, 1999 when the National Federation for 
the Blind (NFB) filed suit in Boston against America Online, Inc. 
(AOL), the nation's largest Internet provider.193 The NFB is a non-
profit organization devoted to protecting the rights of the visually dis-
abled and has over 50,000 members nationwide.194 The Title III issues 
raised in this lawsuit, such as communication barrier removal, the 
auxiliary aids and services provision, and the "readily achievable" and 
"undue burden" language, will no doubt apply to future lawsuits in-
volving Title III applicability to the Internet.195 This lawsuit repre-
sented the first battle of two Goliaths-the leading national organiza-
189 See Bristo, supra note 113. 
190 See generally Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet 
Sites, 2000: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong (2000). 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
m See Bick, supra note 19, at 217; Blanck & Sandler, supra note 108, at 855. 
194 Law Suit Filed Against AOL fry the National Federation for the Blind, at http:/ / 
www.libertyresources.org/news/news_17.html(Nov.11 , 1999) [hereinafter NFB Lawsuit]. 
19542U.S.C.§12182(b)(2) (1990). 
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tion of blind persons versus an e-commerce company that describes 
itself as "the world's leader in interactive services."196 Although the 
parties have settled upon the release of the more accessible AOL ver-
sion 6.0, the settlement marks only the beginning of the inevitable 
litigation between the visually disabled and private Internet sites over 
the scope ofthe ADA,197 
In the class action lawsuit,198 the NFB declared that AOL violated 
the ADA because its services were inaccessible to the blind and there-
fore did not comply with the accessibility requirements of Title 111.199 
The plaintiffs claimed that AOL "designed its service so that it is in-
compatible with screen access software programs for the blind. "200 
Specifically, the NFB charged AOL with violating the ADA's commu-
nications barriers removal provision, the auxiliary aids and services 
provision, the reasonable modifications provisions, and the full and 
equal enjoyment and participation provision.201 The Plaintiffs brought 
the lawsuit for injunctive and declaratory relief, seeking both to en-
join AOL from continued violations and an order requiring AOL to 
redesign its services so blind people can have independent access 
through screen access software.202 
According to the NFB, because of AOL's insistence that users run 
proprietary AOL software to access its services, visually disabled peo-
ple are effectively "shut out" from AOL because the AOL proprietary 
software is incompatible with screen reading technology.203 Screen 
reading software has three main components.204 First, the software 
provides keyboard equivalents for many commands that are normally 
performed with a mouse.205 Second, most screen reader programs are 
compatible with and rely on generic Windows controls like "file, edit, 
196 See Complaint, supra note 18. 
197 Online Accessibility Agreement, supra note 20. 
198 See Complaint, supra note 18. The suit was filed in Federal District Court. See NFB 
Lawsuit, supra note 194. The plaintiffs included the National Federation of the Blind, Inc., 
the National Federation of the Blind of Massachusetts, Inc., and nine blind citizens of Mas-
sachusetts who all faced some level of inaccessibility to America Online. See id. 
199 See id.; Blanck & Sandler, supra note 108, at 855. 
200 See Complaint, supra note 18; Pierce, supra note 18. 
201 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii-iii) (1990); see Complaint, supra note 18. 
202 See Complaint, supra note 18; Pierce, supra note 18. 
203 See Richard Ring, America Online: Stonewalling Responsibility and Ignuring Access for the 
Blind, at http://www.nfb.org/bm/bmOO/bm0001/bm000107.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 
2002). The lawsuit was filed before AOL 6.0 was released. See Welcome to AOL Anywhere, at 
http://www.aol.com (last visited Mar. 17,2002). 
204 See Ring, supra note 203. 
205 See id. 
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view insert, etc. "206 Third, and very much relevant to private Internet 
sites, screen reader technology will display a textual message in place 
of a picture on the screen.207 For example, many web sites today make 
use of elaborate visual graphics-although the blind obviously cannot 
see such a display, screen reader technology will offer the reader a 
textual explanation if one is provided by the website.208 
The pre-6.0 AOL proprietary software did not meet many of the 
requirements necessary to effectively run a screen reader program.209 
The most formidable obstacle to the visually disabled is the sign-up 
and installation process.210 Screen reader technologies cannot detect 
the location of the button that tells AOL whether one is a new or ex-
isting user and is not compatible with the online forms required to 
enter in personal information.211 In addition, the AOL welcome 
screen presents a complex· and confusing layout to the blind due to 
unlabeled visual icons and is often preceded by on-screen advertise-
ments in an unpredictable fashion. 212 Two other major features of the 
AOL software, the "Channels" service and "Headline News," are also 
inaccessible to the visually disabled.2l!I 
B. Readily Achievable and Not an Undue Burden 
The first two counts of the complaint allege that AOL violated 
the ADA by not eliminating major obstacles in accessibility to the 
visually disabled.214 These counts focus on Section 302 of the ADA 
that prohibit discrimination by public accommodations.215 Count I 
deals with the Communication Barriers Removal Mandate, addressing 
the illegality of AOL's failure to remove any communication barriers 
"where such removal is readily achievable. "216 The ADA defines readily 
206 See id. 
207 See Chong, supra note 12. 
208 See id. 
209 See grmerally Ring, supra note 203. In fairness to AOL, while the majority of AOL 
services are largely inaccessible to the blind, AOL's electronic mail service is "minimally 
usable." See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
215 See Ring, supra note 203. Channels provides AOL users with a convenient way to 
browse through numerous subjects such as news, weather, sports, and shopping, etc. See id. 
Headline News presents the AOL user with current events headlines in an animated news-
ticker-like display. See id. 
214 See Complaint, supra note 18. 
215 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1990). 
216Id. § 12182(2) (A) (iv); see Complaint, supra note 18. 
414 Boston CoUege Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:389 
achievable as "easily accomplish able and able to be carried out with-
out much difficulty or expense."217 Some factors to considered when 
making this evaluation are "the nature and cost of the action; the 
overall financial resources of the facility ... involved in the action; the 
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses 
and resources ... and the overall size of the business of a covered en-
tity. "218 In the fiscal year 1999, AOL's total assets were in excess of 5.3 
billion dollars, and the service had approximately 17.6 million cus-
tomers worldwide.219 In 2000, AOL's net income growth was an as-
tounding 51.2%, and the company employed approximately fifteen 
thousand people.22o Given these figures, it is apparent that AOL has 
the resources to undertake the removal of accessibility barriers to the 
visually disabled. 221 
The Department of Justice advises that what is readily achievable 
will be determined on a case-by-case basis and provides several exam-
ples of readily achievable modifications to existing facilities. 222 Some 
of these examples include "making curb cuts at sidewalks, rearranging 
display racks . . . and adding raised letters or Braille to elevator con-
trol buttons. ''223 The NFB asked AOL to input comparatively similar 
changes that are readily achievable.224 AOL only needs to "rearrange" 
their information which would act as "Braille" for the blind.225 With 
the resources of AOL, this type of barrier removal is certainly "easily 
accomplishable. "226 
The NFB, in Count II, states that AOL's failure to redesign its 
Internet service to permit the blind to use it through screen access 
programs violates the auxiliary aids and services provisions of Title III 
because it constitutes a failure to take steps to ensure that individuals 
who are blind are not denied access to the service.227 The provision of 
the statute finds such failure to be discriminatory unless taking such 
steps would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service or would 
21742 U.S.C. § 12181 (9). 
218 Id. § 12181 (9) (A)-(D). 
219 See Complaint, supra note 18. 
22\) See America Online, Inc., Capsule, at http://www.hoovers.com/co/ (last visited Mar. 
17,2002). 
221 See id. 
222 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TITLE III HIGHLIGHTS, athttp://www.usdoj.gov/ 
crt/ada/t3hilght.htm (2002) [hereinafter DOj, TITLE III HIGHLIGHTS]. 
223 See id. 
224 See Complaint, supra note 18. 
225 See DOj, TITLE III HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 222. 
226 See America Online, Inc., Capsule, supra note 220. 
22742 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2)(A)(iii) (1990); see Complaint, supra note 18. 
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result in an undue burden. "228 Like the readily achievable standard, 
an "undue burden" is defined as a "significant difficulty or ex-
pense. "229 Again, it is clear that expense will not be a problem for 
AOL, and the technology required to implement a more accessible 
version is not complex.23o 
As mentioned previously, screen access software assists the visually 
disabled in utilizing the Internet.231 This technology translates infor-
mation on the screen into synthesized speech, or more commonly, 
Braille.232 The screen access software normally moves from Internet 
hypertext link to link when a user is logged onto a web page.233 A 
blind person using the software can read the text from the hypertext 
links through Braille in order to navigate through the Internet.234 The 
screen access program also converts ASCII235 text from the website 
screen into Braille or voice so the reader can receive the informa-
tion.236 Instead of using a mouse, visually disabled people often use 
the tab key to move around the screen.237 
Modifying a private website or Internet service like AOL in order 
to make it more accessible to the visually disabled is a simple task and 
thus not an undue burden.238 For example, an analysis of Harvard 
University's web system found that three-quarters of their sites are ei-
ther already accessible to screen readers or can be made accessible 
with relatively minor modifications.239 When creating a more accessi-
ble website, it is essential for the designer to input as much textual 
information as possible.240 Screen access software cannot interpret 
pictures-it can only convert text into Braille.241 It is not necessary for 
web designers to compromise the visual creativity of their websites 
when creating a web page; however, it is important to describe graph-
228 42 u.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii). 
229 SeeDOJ, nTLE III HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 222. 
250 See Chong, supra note 12; America Online, Inc., Capsuk, supra note 220. 
m SeeChong, supra note 12. 
2~2 See id. 
25~ See id. 
2M Seeid. 
2~5 See Encyclopedia Britannica, at http://www.britannica.com/(2001).This acronym 
stands for American Standard Code for Information Interchange. See id. 
250 SeeChong, supra note 12. 
237 See id. 
238 42 u.s.c. § 12182(2) (A)(iii) (1990); see Fact Sheets for "Web Content Accessibility Guide-
lines 1.0, »availabk at http://www.w3.org/1999/05/WCAG-RECfact (May 5, 1999). 
259 Alvin Powell, Making Web Access a Reality, MARv. u. GAZETTE,June 14,2001, at 18. 
240 See Chong, supra note 12. 
241 See id. 
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ics with textual icons to inform the reader about what is on the 
screen.242 
There are many ways in which web designers can make their web-
sites more accessible to the blind.243 First, as mentioned before, web-
sites should utilize ASCII text wherever possible-in hypertext links, 
document content, menus, and labeling graphics.244 Although ASCII 
text is not always the most aesthetically pleasing visual display, it is 
necessary when using screen access software.245 Second, navigating 
through the many links on a complex web page is easier for visually 
disabled people if the designer provides contextual ASCII hypertext 
labels.246 Oftentimes hyperlinks will be labeled "click here" as opposed 
to a more meaningful label that provides the content of the link and 
would therefore aid the visually impaired.247 Third, web designers 
should always label the visual images on the website.248 Instead of la-
beling graphics with arbitrary filenames or merely the word "picture" 
or "graphic," the web designer should provide an ASCII textual icon 
describing the picture and use a more descriptive word in labeling the 
filename of the graphic.249 The webmaster for Harvard University, 
Elaine Benfatto, remarked that "It's appalling how many people don't 
name their images ... all the careful planning they put into a naviga-
tion screen is meaningless to a visually impaired person using a screen 
reader. "250 
Finally, web designers should develop more simple web-based 
forms. 251 For example, in their complaint, the NFB cites to the sign-up 
form as one of AOL's many ADA violations.252 Specifically, the NFB 
points out that the method AOL uses to display the text from its sign-
up screen does not provide screen access programs with sufficient in-
formation to tell the blind user which piece of data is being requested 
in each blank field. 253 Web designers also either need to scale back or 
242 See id. 
243 See id. Although I explicitly mention five methods in this Note, this list is certainly 
not exclusive. See id. 
244 See Chong, supra note 12. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See id. 
249 See Chong, supra note 12. 
250 See Powell, supra note 239. 
251 See Chong, supra note 12. 
252 See Complaint, supra note 18. 
253 See id. 
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eliminate "splash screens. "254 When a splash screen appears, the focus 
of the screen access software is pulled back to the top of the web page, 
which can be extremely frustrating when reading a long document.255 
Operators of public accommodations must provide auxiliary aids 
and services unless such operators can prove that such modifications 
would "fundamentally alter" the nature of such goods and services or 
result in an "undue burden. "256 As one commentator noted, requiring 
Internet services like AOL to be compatible with screen reader tech-
nology is similar to requiring a bookstore to offer ramps and bath-
rooms for the disabled, efforts that are not considered undue bur-
dens.257 Organizations like the NFB are not asking AOL to provide a 
Braille version of their services; rather, they are only asking for access 
to such content.258 However, there is evidence that suggests that Title 
III requires such existing public accommodations to provide Brailled 
materials.259 In 1994, BAR/BRI, a bar review course company, settled a 
lawsuit with the DOl who alleged that BAR/BRI violated Title III by 
failing to provide Braille materials to a blind student.260 If providing 
Brailled information does not constitute an undue burden, then cer-
tainly the request of better access to information does not breach the 
Title III exception. 261 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory language and federal agency guidelines combined 
with the persuasive legislative history of Title III compels a broad 
reading of the public accommodation provisions and therefore the 
applicability of the ADA to the Internet. Although courts have re-
cently begun to scale back on the power of the ADA, the relative nov-
elty of the Internet has presented a new challenge.262 A case directly 
254 See Chong, supra note 12. A "splash screen" is an "initial website page used to cap-
ture the user's attention for a short time as a promotion or lead-in to the site home page 
or to tell the user what kind of browser and other software they need to view the site. See 
Whatis.com: IT-Speciftc Encyclopedia, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/(2002) . 
255 See Chong, supra note 12. 
256 See Paul V. Sullivan, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Anarysis of Title III 
and AppUcable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1117, 1185 (1995). 
257 See Bick, supra note 19, at 217. 
256 See id. 
259 See Sullivan, supra note 256, at 1186 n.95. 
260 See id. at 1186. 
261 See Bick, supra note 19, at 217; Sullivan, supra note 256, at 1186. 
262 See grJneraUy Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 134 (2002); Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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dealing with the ADA and the Internet has yet to reach the appellate 
courts; however, future courts will certainly pay heed to Judge Pos-
ner's dicta describing public accommodations occupying electronic 
space.263 
In an era in which it is more convenient for a blind person to 
participate in activities like shopping via the Internet than in a more 
traditional manner, it is unfortunate that commercial Internet sites 
resist complying with ADA public accommodation standards. As the 
Internet becomes a more integral part of mainstream American life, 
the courts should recognize that the Internet is as much a public ac-
commodation as a shopping mall and act appropriately in ordering 
the removal of communication barriers to the visually disabled.264 The 
DOl's 1996 advisory letter and the Congressional subcommittee hear-
ings on this issue were the first steps in the government's recognition 
of the broadening frontier of public accommodations.265 The 
NFB/ AOL litigation was a manifestation of this public debate and 
their settlement is a strong sign that commercial Internet companies 
will eventually concede to the public interest of the ADA.266 The battle 
for accessibility to the Internet is far from over, but the disabled's 
fight to eliminate another piece of the "shameful wall of exclusion" is 
becoming a reality.267 
263 SeeDoev.Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999). 
264 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1990). See generall:y, Bick, supra note 19. 
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